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BALANCING FEDERAL ARBITRATION POLICY WITH WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION:
A COMMENT ON KHAZIN V. TD AMERITRADE
By
Faith Van Horn*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

In Khazin v. TD Ameritrade,1 an employee of a financial services company filed
suit against his employer pursuant to a whistleblower protection provision in the DoddFrank Act.2 The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claim, alleging that
it was within the arbitration agreement signed by the employer and employee.3 The
Third Circuit held that this whistleblower retaliation claim did not fall within the
exception in the Dodd-Frank Act prohibiting arbitration of certain types of claims, and
the Court granted the motion to compel arbitration.4 Although this decision, when taken
alone, makes the Third Circuit appear to be hospitable to arbitration, it does not actually
indicate much about the Third Circuit’s stance on arbitration as a general matter.
However, the case does provide insight into the interaction between the Dodd-Frank Act
and the federal policy favoring arbitration embodied in the FAA.5 To date, there are few
federal court decisions dealing with the issue of the arbitrability of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower claims because the Act is relatively recent, but the Third Circuit’s decision
in Khazin is consistent with other previously litigated cases.
II.  

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff-appellant, Boris Khazin (hereafter “Khazin”), is a financial services
professional who previously worked as an employee of the defendant-appellee, TD
Ameritrade, Inc. (hereafter “TD”).6 At the beginning of Khazin’s employment, Khazin
and TD executed an employment agreement that contained an arbitration clause in which
the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising out of Khazin’s employment with TD.7
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Khazin’s responsibilities at TD involved performing due diligence on the
financial products offered by the company to ensure compliance with securities
regulations.8 During the course of his work, Khazin discovered that one of the products
offered by TD to customers did not comply with certain securities regulations.9 Upon
making this discovery, Khazin reported the problem to his supervisor, Lule Demmissie,
along with his recommendations for bringing the product into compliance.10
Demmissie was initially receptive to Khazin’s concerns, and requested that he
analyze the “revenue impact” of his proposal.11 When Khazin’s analysis revealed that his
proposed changes would save customers $2 million, but would cost TD $1.15 million and
would negatively impact one of Demmissie’s divisions, Demmissie ordered Khazin not to
make any changes to the product’s pricing.12 Khazin later approached Demmissie again
to recommend changes to remedy the violation, but again Demmissie told Khazin that
changes would not be made, and told him to stop contacting her regarding the matter.13
Over the following months, Demmissie, along with TD’s human resources
department, approached Khazin about an unrelated billing irregularity that Khazin claims
had nothing to do with his duties at TD.14 The billing problem turned out to be nonexistent, but nevertheless, Khazin was told that he could no longer be trusted, and TD
terminated his employment.15
Khazin initially brought suit against TD in New Jersey state court, alleging state
law claims and violation of the Dodd-Frank Act, claiming that he was terminated as
retaliation for whistleblowing.16 The state court dismissed the Dodd-Frank claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
Dodd-Frank claims, and compelled arbitration of the state law claims.17
Khazin then brought his Dodd-Frank claim in federal district court in the District
of New Jersey, claiming that the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-Arbitration Provision (“the
Provision”) prevents whistleblowers from being compelled to arbitrate their claims.18
The Provision states that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this
8
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section.”19 TD argued that (1) the Provision did not forbid arbitration of Khazin’s
particular type of claim, and (2) the Provision did not apply retroactively to bar
enforcement of agreements, such as this one, signed before the Act took effect.20 The
district court found in favor of TD, holding that the Act does not apply retroactively.21
Khazin now brings an appeal arguing that the arbitration agreement he signed is not
enforceable under the Provision.22
III.  

COURT’S ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Third Circuit examined the issue of whether the Anti-Arbitration
Provision, or any other provision, of the Dodd-Frank Act invalidates the arbitration
agreement that Khazin signed as part of his employment agreement with TD.23 The
district court did not reach this issue, instead deciding the case in favor of TD based on
the non-retroactivity of the Dodd-Frank provisions.24 The Third Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, but on different grounds, concluding that because Khazin’s
claim arises under Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Securities Exchange Act (referred to
in the opinion as the “Dodd-Frank claim”), it does not fall within the specific exemptions
granted by the Provision.25
A.  The Dodd-Frank Act Only Adds the Anti-Arbitration Provision to Specific
Causes of Action
The Third Circuit began its analysis by examining the history of the Dodd-Frank
Act and its Anti-Arbitration Provision. Specifically, the Third Circuit distinguished
causes of action arising under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) from those arising under
the Dodd-Frank amendments to the Securities Exchange Act (“the Dodd-Frank cause of
action”).26 The whistleblower protection program was created by the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and is designed to
prevent employers from retaliating against employees who provide information to the
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), participate in SEC proceedings, or make
statutorily required disclosures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other securities

19

Id. at 490 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2)).

20

Id. at 490.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Khazin, 773 F.3d at 490-91.

24

Id.at 491.

25

Id. at 494.

26

Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491-92.

144

statutes.27 The Act also created a new cause of action for whistleblowers who have
suffered retaliation.28 Khazin’s claim arises under this new cause of action.29
The Third Circuit noted the substantive distinctions between the SOX and the
Dodd-Frank causes of action for whistleblowers: specifically each “act has its ‘own
prohibited conduct, statute of limitations, and remedies.’”30 SOX also has an exhaustion
requirement, which the Dodd-Frank cause of action does not have, and the potential
remedies under each cause of action are different.31 These distinctions are significant
because they justify treating claims arising under each of the acts differently.32
In addition to creating a whistleblower protection provision under the Securities
Exchange Act, the Dodd-Frank Act also added the Anti-Arbitration Provision to the
existing whistleblower protection provisions under SOX and the Commodity and
Exchange Act.33 In both, the provision states that “no predispute arbitration agreement
shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising
under this section.”34 However, the Dodd-Frank Act did not include the Anti-Arbitration
Provision in the new cause of action it created under the Securities Exchange Act.35 This
is the distinction on which Khazin’s case turned.
B.  The Language of the Anti-Arbitration Provision Does Not Include Claims
Arising Under the Dodd-Frank Cause of Action
The Third Circuit decided that Khazin’s claim failed because it did not arise under
one of the limited causes of action covered by the Dodd-Frank Anti-Arbitration
Provision.36 After examining the text and structure of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Third
Circuit concluded that the Provision only attaches to certain statutory claims, and that
Khazin’s claim was not one of them.37
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1.   The Anti-Arbitration Provision Was Not Applied to the Dodd-Frank
Cause of Action
The Third Circuit noted that the Anti-Arbitration Provision enacted as part of the
Dodd-Frank Act is limited in its scope.38 Khazin argued that the Provision referred to his
cause of action brought under the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the Third Circuit reasoned
that the “this section” referred to by the Provision is the section containing the SOX
cause of action: 39 Section 1514A of Title 18 of the United States Code.40
In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit examined the structure of the DoddFrank Act and the amendments that it adds to existing statutes.41 Specifically, the Third
Circuit noted that the Provision specifically prohibits enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements relating to disputes “arising under this section.”42 The Court
reasons that, because the Anti-Arbitration Provision explicitly states that it “amend[s]
‘Section 1514A of title 18, United States Code by adding that provision at the end,’” the
“this section” referred to in the Provision is Section 1514A, which contains the SOX
cause of action.43 Therefore, even though the Dodd-Frank cause of action and the AntiArbitration Provision are located in the same section of the Dodd-Frank Act, the AntiArbitration Provision does not apply to the Dodd-Frank cause of action. Because
Khazin’s claim arises under the Dodd-Frank cause of action, the court reasoned, the AntiArbitration Provision did not apply to his claim.44 The text of the Dodd-Frank Act
explicitly applies the Provision to the SOX cause of action, not broadly to all securitiesrelated whistleblower causes of action.45
2.   “When Congress Amends One Statutory Provision But Not Another, It
is Presumed to Have Acted Intentionally”46
Khazin argued that the Anti-Arbitration Provision was not attached to the DoddFrank cause of action due to an unintentional omission by Congress because “a bill as
massive as Dodd-Frank will inevitably contain gaps not intended by Congress.”47 The
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Third Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the fact that Dodd-Frank added the Provision to
other causes of action but not the Dodd-Frank cause of action indicates “that the omission
was deliberate.”48 In support this conclusion, the court noted that “the amendments to
SOX, including the Anti-Arbitration Provision, are adjacent to the Dodd-Frank cause of
action in the text of Dodd-Frank,” which further shows that the omission was not an
oversight.49
C.  The Differences Between the Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Causes of
Action Justify Treating Claims Arising Under Each of the Acts Differently
Khazin argued that his Dodd-Frank claim should be treated in the same way as a
SOX claim, and that not applying the Anti-Arbitration Provision to his claim would
“undermine Dodd-Frank’s broader purpose” of protecting whistleblowers.50 The Third
Circuit disagreed, citing the many differences between claims brought under each of the
causes of action.51 The Court reasoned that applying the purpose of the statute in
contravention of the literal language of the law could frustrate congressional intent, and
that the text and structure of the Dodd-Frank Act were clearly not intended to grant
Khazin a right to resist arbitration of his claim.52
The Third Circuit also supported its decision with reference to the “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration.”53 The Third Circuit also noted that courts must enforce
arbitration agreements as written, including agreements involving statutory rights, unless
Congress has explicitly overridden the FAA in this regard with a contrary command.54
Although Congress did override the FAA by appending the Anti-Arbitration Provision to
some causes of action, the court reasoned, Congress declined to add the Provision to the
Dodd-Frank cause of action.55 The court therefore concluded that Khazin’s claim was
arbitrable.56
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D.  The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Invalidate All Broadly Worded Arbitration
Agreements
Finally, the Third Circuit noted that the district court’s decision to enforce the
arbitration agreement is consistent with previous cases in which courts interpreted similar
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.57 Khazin argued that a Fourth Circuit case, Santoro v.
Accenture Federal Services, LLC58 contains language suggesting that the Anti-Arbitration
Provision invalidates all agreements to arbitrate Dodd-Frank claims.59 The Third Circuit
rejected this reasoning because such an interpretation would be inconsistent with
congressional intent as expressed in the FAA, and because the claims in Santoro did not
involve whistleblower protection, which distinguished those claims from Khazin’s.60
In support of his claim Khazin also cites a FINRA regulation, which provides that
whistleblower disputes are not required to be arbitrated pursuant to predispute
agreements.61 Khazin argued that this FINRA regulation meant that he could not be
compelled to arbitrate his claim. 62 The Third Circuit, however, looked to regulatory
notices to conclude that the regulation clearly only applies to claims arising under SOX.63
IV.  

SIGNIFICANCE

As the Third Circuit noted in Khazin, the Dodd-Frank Act is thousands of pages
long and adds multiple amendments to several existing statutes.64 As the arguments
made by plaintiff Khazin illustrate, the scope of some of these amendments is unclear
without a careful reading of both the Dodd-Frank Act and the provisions of the existing
statutes that the Act amends. This case is particularly significant for practitioners in the
Third Circuit because it definitively establishes that claims arising under the Dodd-Frank
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act are arbitrable.65 Absent a future action by
Congress adding an Anti-Arbitration Provision to the Dodd-Frank cause of action,
practitioners can now know that their clients’ agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of
Dodd-Frank’s amendments to the Securities Exchange Act will be enforced in the Third
Circuit.
57
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It is, however, important to note that the Third Circuit’s decision in Khazin does
not reveal much one way or the other about the Third Circuit’s broader position on
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Given the language and structure of the DoddFrank Act’s amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, the Third Circuit was left with
no real choice but to enforce the arbitration agreement between Khazin and TD.66
Because FAA Section 2 requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written
unless there is a contrary command by Congress,67 and because it appears clear from the
structure and text of the Dodd-Frank act that Congress intentionally did not append the
Anti-Arbitration Provision to the amended Securities Exchange Act (the Dodd-Frank
cause of action),68 the only feasible interpretation of Dodd-Frank required the Court to
enforce the agreement and compel arbitration.
This case is also of special significance because, so far, the Third Circuit appears
to be the only Court of Appeals to have ruled on the specific question of the arbitrability
of claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act as amended by Section 922 of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Other circuits have ruled on the larger question of Dodd-Frank’s effect
on broadly worded arbitration agreements.69 However, this case is was the first instance
in which a circuit court was presented with the specific question of whether and how the
Anti-Arbitration Provision affects claims arising under statutes amended by Dodd-Frank
but which do not include the Provision. After Khazin, practitioners now have the answer
to that question: whistleblower claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act as
amended by Dodd-Frank are arbitrable.
V.  

CRITIQUE

The Dodd-Frank Act targets the financial services sector, with a stated purpose of
“promot[ing] the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system.”70 Additionally, the Act specifically places the
Provision in some statutes while leaving it out of others,71 making it indeed unreasonable
to suggest that the Provision applies to effectively invalidate any broad arbitration
agreement that could potentially, though does not actually, interfere with the AntiArbitration Provision. Because the Dodd-Frank Act is barely five years old, there is a
66

Id. at 492 n.3.

67

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012).
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Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492.
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For example, Santoro v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LLC, 748 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. Va. 2014) and Holmes v.
Air Liquide USA, L.L.C., 498 Fed. Appx. 405 (5th Cir. Tex. 2012) both interpreted Dodd-Frank antiarbitration provisions narrowly, applying the provisions only to claims arising under the section of the
statute to be amended by that portion of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010).
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For example, sections in the Dodd-Frank Act that do contain anti-arbitration provisions include §
922(e)(2) modifying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 748(n)(2) modifying the Commodity and Exchange Act,
and § 1057(d)(2) discussing employee protection.
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limited amount of precedent dealing with the arbitrability of claims brought under
existing statutes that were amended by the Act. However, to the extent that the issue of
arbitrability under Dodd-Frank has been litigated, the Third Circuit’s holding in Khazin is
consistent with previous decisions.
Early cases addressing the application of the Dodd-Frank amendments to
arbitration agreements illustrate courts’ unwillingness to allow the Act to be used as a
broad means of invalidating arbitration agreements. In Holmes v. Air Liquide USA,
L.L.C.,72 the Fifth Circuit held that the Dodd-Frank amendments will not invalidate a
broad arbitration agreement simply because a whistleblower claim has been brought
under a statute amended by Dodd-Frank.73 The Fifth Circuit noted that if the AntiArbitration Provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act were read to apply to every
statute that has been amended by Dodd-Frank, even where Dodd-Frank did not add an
Anti-Arbitration Provision to that statute, this would lead to “unreasonable results.”74 If
such arguments were successful, the result would be “the untenable conclusion that the
Act wholesale invalidates all broadly-worded arbitration agreements…even when
plaintiffs bring wholly unrelated claims.”75
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit offered an even narrower analysis. In Santoro
v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LLC,76 the Fourth Circuit case cited by Khazin in support of his
argument that the Anti-Arbitration Provision does apply to his claim, the Fourth Circuit
examined the interaction between the Dodd-Frank Act and FAA Section 2.77 Rather than
offering support for Khazin’s argument, the Fourth Circuit in Santoro emphasized the
limited application of the Dodd-Frank Anti-Arbitration Provision to whistleblower claims
arising under specific statutes amended by Dodd-Frank.78 The court in Santoro
concluded that the Provision does not apply to any and every claim arising out of the
employment context.79 The Fourth Circuit in Santoro emphasized that the AntiArbitration Provision only applies to whistleblower claims, holding the Anti-Arbitration
Provision to be inapplicable because the plaintiff did not bring a whistleblower claim.80
Although Khazin did bring a whistleblower claim, unlike the plaintiff in Santoro, the
Santoro case still serves to emphasize the limited scope of the several Anti-Arbitration
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Holmes v. Air Liquide, L.L.C., 498 Fed. Appx. 405 (2012).
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Holmes, 498 Fed. Appx. at 406.
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Provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act by upholding the arbitrability of disputes
under statutes to which the Dodd-Frank Act did not add an anti-arbitration provision.81
The Third Circuit in Khazin took this analysis of the application of the AntiArbitration Provision one step further. The court in Khazin emphasized that not only does
the Provision only apply to whistleblower claims, but it is also limited by the text and
structure of the Act to specifically defined whistleblower claims.82
The Third Circuit also cited two district court cases, Ruhe v. Masimo Corp83 and
Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC,84 both of which also involved claims arising under the DoddFrank cause of action. In Ruhe, as in Khazin, the plaintiff argued that the AntiArbitration Provision was unintentionally omitted as the result of a mere “drafting
error.”85 The court in Ruhe disagreed, noting that Congress later proposed further
amendments to the statute which did not include an anti-arbitration provision.86 In
Murray, the court held that there was not enough evidence to show that Congress
unintentionally omitted the Anti-Arbitration Provision. Rather, the Murray court
reasoned, the differences between the Dodd-Frank cause of action and the SOX cause of
action, which does contain the Provision, indicated that the omission was intentional.87
In Khazin, the Third Circuit rested its holding primarily on the text and structure
of the amendments Dodd-Frank adds to existing statutes.88 The Court focused on the
plain meaning of the Act. This analysis led the court to conclude that because Congress
did not include the Anti-Arbitration Provision in the amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act, Congress did not intend for the Anti-Arbitration Provision to be applied to
claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act.89 This holding leaves the door open
for Congress to add the Anti-Arbitration Provision to the Securities Exchange Act
amendments if Congress did indeed intend for the Provision to apply to claims arising
under that cause of action.
VI.  

CONCLUSION

The plain language and the structure of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments compel
the conclusion that the omission of the Anti-Arbitration Provision from the Dodd-Frank
cause of action was intentional and not the result of a drafting error. Therefore, the Third
81
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Id. at *14.

87

Murray, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9696 at *23-27.

88

Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492.

89

Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493.

151

Circuit may not read in the Anti-Arbitration Provision and apply it to Khazin’s claim. If
Congress indeed intended for the Provision to apply to the Dodd-Frank cause of action,
Congress can amend this section to include the provision. But, until Congress takes such
action, agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Dodd-Frank cause of action will
be upheld in the Third Circuit.
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